Implications of the State of the Dairy Economy by Jacobson, Robert E.
1 Implications of the State of the Dairy Economy 
Two major phenomena describe the state of the dairy economy 
in this nation today. These phenomena are 
1. A substantial excess of milk production over commercial 
demand at established price levels. Furthermore, the problem 
is not getting resolved; production and surpluses have been 
and are increasing. 
2. Some general disarray in the producer sector in getting 
to an acceptable price support solution that Congress and the 
Administration would find credible in terms of reducing milk 
surpluses and program costs. 
At this juncture, everything else in the dairy economy 
has become secondary. My intention is to dwell more on the 
state of the dairy economy, and less on the implications of 
the situation. 
First, a statement of fact: when national milk supplies 
exceed market needs by four percent or more on an annual basis, 
then the level of producer milk prices and income is affected 
almost exclusively by provisions of the price support program. 
That is why price support discussion commands the dairy arena at 
the present time. Let me trot out some of the standard measures 
of the dairy outlook so that we can have some kind of a common 
base. 
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1. So far, with respect to producer milk prices, we have 
not yet seen any pain -- we have only seen the expectation of 
pain. Blend prices in Grade A markets and manufacturing milk 
prices in B markets (a) continue to look quite healthy 
relative to the rest of agriculture, and (b) continue to hold 
very well in comparison to last year's prices. January, 1983 
blend prices in 45 Federal order markets averaged $13.63 per 
cwt., up by one cent from January, 1982. The January, 1983 
M-W price of $12.62 was up 17 cents from a year ago, but down 
2 cents from two years ago. The fact that we have not seen 
pain yet does not diminish the problem. We know absolutely 
that economic discipline will be coming to the milk producer 
sector. 
2. The quickest way to zero in on the milk surplus 
problem in the United States is to look at the recent trends 
in milk production, commercial demand, and CCC purchases. 
Since our national dairy herd began rebuilding in cow numbers 
in mid-1979, we can select 1979 as a starting point. 
U.S. Milk Commercial CCC 
Production Demand Purchases 
1979 123.4 Bil. Lbs. 120.2 Bil. Lbs. 2.1 Bil. Lbs. m.e. 
1980 128.4 119.2 8.8 
1981 132.6 120.1 12.9 
1982 135.8 122.0 14.3 
1983 (138.0) (123.0) (15.0) 
The data essentially tell us that milk production has been 
walking away from aggregate demand in this past four years. 
CCC has been picking up the difference, and that now means a 
surplus equivalent to more than 10 percent of production. 
The situation in 1983 and 1984 promises to worsen unless 
meaningful changes can be made quickly in the dairy price 
support program. 
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Several quick observations should be made about the dairy 
outlook: 
A. The 2.4 percent production increase from 1981 to 1982 
shows little sign of abating. Production in January, 1983 
was up 1.6 percent from January, 1982. Cow numbers were up 
again in January, 1983, at 11,055,000 milk cows in the national 
dairy herd. That is 350,000 more cows than the mid-1979 estimate. 
We may be at the peak of the cycle, but we may not. 
B. The ratio of replacement heifers 500 pounds and over 
per 100 milk cows stood at a record 43.5 on July 1, 1982. For 
the entire 1965-1975 decade, this ratio was only 32-33 heifers. 
The slight decline in the ratio on January 1, 1983 to 41.0 was 
mostly a seasonal factor, and a huge reservoir of dairy animals 
is getting ready for production. 
The price of milk cows for replacement purposes dropped to 
$1,050 in January, 1983. That's down 15 percent from the record 
$1,240 reported for January, 1981. The drop in price may be a 
measure of producer milk price expectations for the future, but 
it is also a measure of the large supply of dairy animals avail-
able for production. 
c. Key factors we generally look to in projecting milk 
production, other than the milk price itself, are feed prices 
(costs) and beef prices. The USDA cost of production studies 
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have shown feed costs to be holding steady at very close to 
50 percent of the total direct and ownership costs of producing 
milk in the 1979-1981 period. The milk-feed price ratio has 
been increasing since mid-1981 and has been at a very healthy 
1.6 level this winter. It is certain to decline as we look 
ahead -- milk prices will weaken, and the PIK program at 
some point will achieve its price purposes -- but it has quite 
a way to tumble, such as 1.3 and below, before milk production 
begins to be squeezed out due to feed costs. That will not happen 
in 1983. 
It's easy to observe that if we have 10 percent too much milk, 
we have 10 percent, or 1 million plus, surplus milk cows. Cow 
culling rates are influenced by beef prices, and beef prices have 
not been any help to the milk industry more recently. Utility 
cow prices averaged 50 cents a pound in 1979, 46 cents in 1980, 
42 cents in 1981, and just under 40 cents in 1982. At thepresent 
time, it's difficult for a milk producer to get much more than 40 cents 
a pound for cull cows. While beef prices are expected to increase 
by 5-8 cents this spring, there is nothing in the 1-2 year out-
look that suggests the kind of price strength required to 
encourage culling. 
Other factors can be introduced, but the point is made. 
There is a substantial excess of milk production overdemand; 
variables affecting production are in a plus phase, and only 
significant changes in the price support program can shift the 
industry back toward balance. 
D. Production is the problem -- not demand, but demand 
should be recognized. When we talk about demand, we are talking 
about domestic demand. The pressure to expand exports 
may be increasing, but we have severe limits on 
any significant commercial export demand. 
The main point to recognize about domestic commercial 
demand is that it's doing fine. Consider the following per 
capita consumption data. 
Table 1. Per Capita Milk Consumption, U.S., 1970- 1982 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Commercial Sources 
511 Lbs. m.e. 
506 
509 
517 
521 
All Sources 
561 Lbs. m.e. 
540 
544 
541 
560 
Source: December, 1982 Dairy Situation, ERS-USDA, p. 18. 
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The data in Table 1 basically say that per capita consumption 
across all milk products has changed very little in this past 
dozen years. Aggregate demand has increased with population 
increases. This does not mean to relax the guard. If NMPF 
can get its 15 cent per cwt. mandatory promotion assessment 
legislated, fine. But it is not a weakening of demand that is 
at the core of today's dairy problem. Also, intensified efforts 
to promote demand are appropriate, but if generic promotion by 
itself can expand demand by as much as 1 percent, it will have 
made a major accomplishment. 
3. Price -- The present support price of $12.80 has been 
constant now for 2 1/2 years. It was 80 percent of parity when 
it was implemented on October 1, 1980 today it is 65 percent 
of parity. The M-W price averaged $12.48 per cwt. in 1982 --
32 cents under the support price. The M-W price has rested 
completely in the range of $12.42 to $12.67 now for 29 
consecutive months -- talk about stability. The outlook on 
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this ultimate barometer of milk prices is exclusively tied to 
the price support program. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1982 promises the $12.80/$13.10 support price through 
September 30, 1984, with a modest parity adjustment for 1984-
85. But we have already seen the dairy title of the Agriculture 
and Food Act of 1981 disintegrate, and the flow of milk produc-
tion promises a similar interruption to the 1982 Act. 
The_9ptions -- At the moment, the milk industry is caught up 
in three support options. These are (1) Mr. Block's one dollar 
assessment, (2) new authority to simply lower the support price 
by authorized amounts, and (3) some version of a proposed 
voluntary base-quota plan, with incentives to reduce production 
and maybe penalties on increasing production. The most common 
thread among the three alternatives is simply a recognition 
that there is surplus milk and something has to be done about it. 
1. The $1 Assessment -- Even today, three weeks from 
implementation, we do not know if the $1.00 assessment to be 
implemented April 1 is going to float. After all, we did not 
know that the first 50 cent assessment implemented last December 1 
was not going to float until more than three weeks after it was 
implemented. 
The most redeeming feature of the $1.00 per cwt. assessment 
on all milk marketed is the certainty that it will make a large 
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cut in CCC net expenditures for dairy price support. Its 
primary minuses include (1) its limited impact on milk production, 
(2) the nebulous aspects of recouping the second 50 cents, ana (3) 
the indiscriminate manner in which al~ milk producers are 
assessed. Enough said -- we'll have to wait and see whether 
it lives or dies, probably in the Federal courts. 
2. Drop In Support Price -- In early May, 1982, Secretary 
Block requested 'discretionary authority' to drop the support 
price. He has not been given that authority. Congress would 
have to authorize it. But we continue to hear noises about 
that possibility. Most recently (Feb. 10), the Congressional 
Budget Office outlined a plan that would drop the support price 
by 50 cents every six months until the total cut amounted to 
$2.50. The main possibility for a lower support price emerging 
is if the other options don't survive, i.e., neither the 
assessment nor a quota plan will be viable. The main arguments 
for a drop in the support price include simplicity (look to the 
marketh and some potential demand stimulation. Main arguments 
against dropping the support price are (1) that all milk 
producers would be affected, and individual producers could not 
find incentives to cut back output and still have price security, 
and (2) more time and more patience than are reasonable to 
expect would be required to achieve supply-demand balance. 
But lower support prices will happen if something else doesn't 
happen. 
3. Base-Quota Plan -- Lack of agreement on getting to some 
kind of a base-quota plan is the most visible symptom of the 
different interest positions across the milk producer sector 
nationally. While the Administration is probably negative 
on most base-quota proposals, it is lack of consensus in the 
producer sector that has proved initially to be the most 
formidable hurdle. The Wisconsin politicos have advanced 
the Dairy Surplus Production Act, with its $10 payments for 
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milk not produced. It is purely voluntary. The NMPF advanced 
its Dairy Compliance Act, with its voluntary incentives to 
cut back and its mandatory dis-incentives to expand. Other 
versions and cross-breeds are sure to follow, and there is 
the (remote) possibility that a program could be legislated. 
Main arguments for a base-quota plan are (1) that it could offer 
a quicker route to reducing production and surpluses, and (2) 
it permits every producer to have more of a say about his own 
economic destiny as he makes production decisions. Main 
arguments against a base-quota plan, assuming that base capitali-
zation possibilities are diminished, are (1) a messy bureaucracy 
would be required to operate the program, (2) once it's there, 
it's tough to get rid of, and (3) no price possibilities would 
exist to stimulate demand. 
So there we have it -- three program avenues in front of us, 
and no inclination to be persuaded that any one of them is in 
front of the other two. But one of the three will have to 
prevail. Without a program change, CCC will continue to acquire 
product at the $12.80/$13.10 support price. With milk production 
continuing to increase, the financial back of the'price 
support program would be broken. CCC net expenditures for 
dairy price support for the 1980-81 marketing year were 
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$1.97 billion and were $2.23 billion in 1981-82. In the first 
five months of this current marketing year, CCC purchases 
are running 24 percent larger than in 1981-82. There has to be 
a change. 
Implications: Regardless of the program changes that 
come along, some major implications of the present situation 
can be identified. Let's see what one list of these might look 
like. 
1. Any new program had better work. The biggest threat --
the largest fear -- has to be that a new dairy program will not 
work, or it will not work quick enough. For example, what if 
a Dairy Surplus Reduction Act would mean even more milk and 
more CCC purchases two years from now? It's that scenario 
that threatens the existence of any kind of a dairy program. 
2. Parity is probably 9one forever as a price target 
concept for milk. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 pushed 
parity to the sidelines. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1982 basically confirmed that push. Today we see milk prices 
at 65 percent of parity, butcornprices are 46 percent of parity, 
soybean prices are ~ percent of parity, and beef prices are 
57 percent of parity. Some new price standard for dairy price 
support is going to have to be lifted up. It's time the 
industry addressed itself to long run policy determinations 
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rather than short run emergency solutions. 
3. The dairy farm structure in the United States will co~~iE~~ 
to concentrate. That is not news. But what about the kinds of effects 
on structure in the squeeze ahead of us? The number of farms with milk 
cows in the u.s. dropped from 322,850 in 1981 to 311,800 in 1982 
(minus -3.4 percent). That only extends the long term trend. 
The number of commercial dairy farms in the U.S. is only about 
60 percent of the number of all farms with milk cows. I doubt 
that the squeeze will hasten the trend toward larger dairy 
farms any faster than has been occurring. Many relatively 
small dairy farmers are in a low debt-high equity position and 
can weather tighter economic times. There will be an adverse 
impact, though, on entry by new,younger dairy farmers, 
especially if we go a base plan route where base acquisition 
is made difficult. 
4. Regionalism has emerged. Two to three decades of 
relative harmony have described the producer sector nationally. 
The old midwest-northeast conflict disappeared. We have accepted 
a national dairy price support program with a single national 
dairy support price. But now we have a national problem, and 
different regions have contributed in different proportions to 
the problem. Therefore, regional differences! The South 
Carolina challenge to the 50 cent assessment illustrates a 
regional reaction. Regionalism was quiet when we did not have 
excessive surpluses; an answer to regaining national unity is 
to be rid of those surpluses. We will hear more about regionalism 
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in the next presentation when differences in regional milk production 
costs are evaluated. 
5. Dairy cooperatives are under a larger burden than 
ever. In the process of guaranteeing member producers a market, 
dairy coops are handling most of the surplus milk in the 
United States. Now we have more surplus than ever. The spring 
flush is right in front of us. Distress prices for surplus 
milk will prevail. High freight costs will occur on milk 
moving long distances just to find an outlet. Coops will find 
it difficult to meet minimum Federal order blend prices. Some 
handlers will exploit the situation by nurturing more non-
members. Changes in the CCC purchase program have their direct 
immediate effect on cooperatives because that is where most 
of the product is found. As milk prices weaken, members will 
get increasingly critical of coop assessments. And the problems 
go on and on. 
How do you turn those kinds of problems into opportunities? 
There may be no reasonable answer. But dairy cooperatives 
should not forget that in most markets, they are the dominant 
marketing institution. Cooperatives have the processing/ 
manufacturing capacity. And whether it's producers looking for 
a market, or handlers looking for milk, dairy coops are front 
and center. Operations and policies may have to be adjusted, 
but surplus milk can mean more opportunities for expanding 
market influence. 
6. Maybe there are some marketing lessons for us in this 
period of stress. And maybe we should be considering those 
lessons. The crutch of an open-ended CCC purchase program has 
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drained a lot of marketing vitality from the industry over this 
past three decades. What are some of the lessons? 
a. In the long run, we cannot produce milk in 
isolation from demand. Producer milk prices will have to 
be established accordingly. The temptations politically, 
in the late 1970's,to push for higher percentages of parity 
ignored demand. That is a short run luxury, but a long run 
cost, and today we are looking at the costs. 
b. If demand is that important, what can we do to 
massage demand? How can we shift our thinking from pricing 
milk to marketing milk and dairy products? What can we do on 
domestic demand? Do dairy exports hold any significant potentials? 
Yes, there are some kinds of answers to these questions. 
Product promotion and broader financial support for it is always 
a first answer. New products such as UHT need to be researched, 
developed, promoted, and marketed. 
The export market for dairy products needs additional 
investigation. I'm not talking about dumping surplus dairy 
products on a donation or subsidized basis. That's not marketing 
-- that's just hiding the problem. We'll always have major 
problems finding commercial export outlets for dairy products, 
but if we could add 1 billion pounds milk equivalent a year in 
the form of some special products to our exports, that would be 
a real boost. 
7. A continuing implication concerns how we support the 
price of milk. By resting the entire national milk price 
structure on CCC purchase prices for butter, cheese, and nonfat 
dry milk, we take away all possibilities for effectively 
competing in the marketplace for sales of these products. 
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With powder at 94 cents a pound, 70 percent of NFDM production 
goes to the government. With butter at $1.50, 31 percent 
goes to the government. In 1960, per capita consumption of 
nonfat dry milk was 6.3 pounds; today it is 2.7 pounds. 
Butter was 7.5 pounds; today it is 4.3 pounds. Fortunately, 
cheese has not been hit -- yet. Isn't there an implication 
here that if we want to support milk prices, and if we want 
to market dairy products, then it's time we got serious about 
some alternatives -- some alternatives that don't kill demand. 
8. A final implication has to do with bad publicit1. 
The costs of the price support program, the visibility of 
inventories as demo~strated in the butter and cheese giveaways, 
and the continuing responsibility of Congress to meet require-
ments of the Budget Control Act of 1974 basically means a 
lot of negative publicity for the milk industry in 1983. The 
problems cannot be denied, but hopefully we can use this period 
as a "teachable moment," for ourselves and for the public. The 
price support program exists for solid reasons, and everyone 
of us has a responsibility to communicate those reasons. 
Those are some of the implications of the dairy economy 
today. Many more should emerge through the remainder of this 
Conference. 

